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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from a conditional plea under I.C.R. 11. The state alleged that the 
defendant had driven under the influence for the second time in ten year and with an excessive 
blood alcohol level and without privileges. The Magistrate Court heard and denied a Motion to 
Suppress the evidence resulting from the seizure of the defendant. The defendant then entered a 
conditional plea to the Driving under the influence with an excessive blood alcohol level charge. 
The defendant appealed the denial of his Motion to Suppress. The District Court heard argument 
and eventually upheld the Magistrate Court's ruling. The defendant again appealed. 
B. Course of Proceedings & Statement of Facts 
On July 22, 2013, Officer Timothy Neal of the Coeur d'Alene Police Department charged 
the defendant with Driving under the influence for the second time in ten years and with an 
excessive blood alcohol level on Tr. p. I 0, L. 1-8; Idaho Uniform Citation No. 105184. On 
October 18, 2013, the Magistrate Court held a hearing on the defendant's Motion to Suppress the 
evidence resulting from the officer's seizure of his person. 
After taking testimony from Patricia Franks and Officer Neal, the Court found that 
Officer Neal arrived on scene and spoke to Ms. Franks about an accident she claimed to have 
seen. Tr. p. 31, L. 3-21. The officer inspected the vehicle involved in the crash, possibly both 
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vehicles, and found no evidence of any damage or anything else that would have required 
reporting the accident. Tr. p. 31, L. 1-5. 
The officer then went to the Coeur d'Alene Lake beach with Ms. Franks and the two 
identified the defendant, at the time in the water in the lake, as the driver of the vehicle. Tr. p. 32, 
L. 6-11. The officer asked the defendant to get out of the water so he could speak with him. Tr. 
p. 32, L. 12-14. The officer was in uniform with a badge and gun. Tr. p.35, L. 6-13. At the time 
the officer made this request, the Court found: 
The record as the Court recalls was that [the officer] asked if [the defendant] could speak 
with him. Just a minute. Officer Neal made contanct with the defendant who was in the 
water with the occupant of the vehicle, about chest deep in the water. He approached the 
defendant and asked if he could speak with him and then they had the contact and the 
defendant came forward. 
Tr. p. 35, L. 18-24. The Court found that as Mr. Burdett came out of the water the officer 
noticed the odor of an alcoholic beverage and that Mr. Burdett had slurred speech and bloodshot 
eyes. Tr. p. 32, L. 22-25. 
The Court concluded that the officer lacked reasonable and articuable suspicion that the 
defendant had committed a crime at the time he asked him to get out of the lake. Tr. p. 33, L. 2-6. 
The Court found that the contact was consensual, and that no seizure occurred. Tr. p. 33, L. 6-9. 
The Court then denied the defendant's Motion to Suppress. The defendant entered a 
conditional plea to Driving under the Influence with an excessive blood alcohol level at that time 
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preserving the right to appeal the Magistrate's denial of his Motion to Suppress. On January 24, 
2014, the defendant's written conditional plea was offered to and accepted by the Magistrate and 
judgment was entered on the Driving under the influence charge. The defendant timely filed a 
motion to appeal by right under I.C.R. I l(a)(2) from the judgment of the Magistrate Court and 
eventually appealed the judgment and had the sentence stayed. 
On July 31, 2014, the District Court heard oral argument from the parties. On August 6, 
2014, the Court issued a written opinion. The Court held that the factual situation was the same 
as that in State v. Fly, 122 Idaho 100 (Ct.App.1991). See Decision on Intermediate Appeal at 3. 
However, the Court misread Fry to hold that a seizure had not occurred. Id., cf Fry, 122 Idaho at 
103. The District Court thus upheld the ruling of the Magistrate Court. The defendant timely 
appealed the District Court's ruling. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Whether an officer seizes a swimming defendant by standing on the shore and asking 





The District Court erred in finding that the officer did not seize the defendant. This 
finding is not supported by the Magistrate Court's factual findings and is based on the District 
Court's misreading of State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100 (Ct.App.1991) and must be reversed. 
B. Standard of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a 
motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact that 
are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional 
principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561 (Ct.App.1996). At a 
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 
127 Idaho 102, 106 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789 (Ct.App.1999). 
C. The officer seized the defendant. 
A seizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual on the 
street or other public place and asks a few questions. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991); 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,497 (1983). Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a 
particular individual, they may generally ask the individual questions and ask to examine 
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identification. Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); 
State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723 (Ct.App.1985). So long as police do not convey a message that 
compliance with their requests is required, the encounter is deemed "consensual" and no 
reasonable suspicion is required. See, e.g., Bostick, supra. A seizure occurs-and the Fourth 
Amendment is implicated-when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has 
in some way restrained a citizen's liberty. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 
(1968). 
The critical inquiry is whether, taking into account all of the circumstances sunounding 
the encounter, "the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was 
not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business." Michigan v. Chesternut, 
486 U.S. 567,569 (1988). 
In Delgado, the Court determined there was no seizure even though 
several uniformed INS officers were stationed near the exits of the factory. 
The Court noted: "The presence of agents by the exits posed no reasonable 
threat of detention to these workers, ... the mere possibility that they would 
be questioned if they sought to leave the buildings should not have 
resulted in any reasonable apprehension by any of them that they would be 
seized or detained in any meaningful way." 
US. v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194,205 (2002) quoting Delgado, 446 U.S. at 219. Thus, 
assuming that the opposite of the Delgado scenario leads to the opposite conclusion, 
blocking all the exits with officers and having them start questioning citizens will amount 
to a seizure. 
In this case, the Magistrate Court found that Officer Neal had not seized the defendant 
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through either a show of physical force or authority. While the facts the Magistrate found are not 
in dispute, the record shows that under the totality of the circumstances, a nonconsensual seizure 
did occur. The Idaho Court of Appeals found in State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100 (Ct.App.1991 ), 
contrary to the District Court's opinion, that: 
the state argues that Fry "voluntarily" rolled down his window at Officer Wilson's 
request. The state points to the fact that the officer displayed no weapons or other 
show of force, and maintains that the officer simply sought Fry's cooperation in 
answering his questions. Officer Wilson, fully dressed in his police officer's 
uniform, knocked on the window of Fry's pickup. Fry rolled down the window 
and Wilson asked Fry what he was doing and if Wilson could have his driver's 
license. Unlike other cases in which the police request the subject's cooperation in 
answering questions, the inquiry here as to what Fry was doing did not give Fry 
the option of answering or not. In addition, the state's characterization of this 
encounter ignores the significant fact that, at the time Officer Wilson approached 
the driver's window, Officer Dunbar had placed himself directly behind Fry's 
vehicle, the front end of which was nearly against the wall of a building, making it 
impossible for Fry to drive away without running over Officer Dunbar. We 
conclude that the police conduct in this case "would have communicated to a 
reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go 
about his business." Accordingly, we hold that Fry was "seized" within the 
meaning of the fourth amendment. 
citing United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1493 (6th Cir.1989) (D.E.A. agents in civilian 
clothing asked driver of vehicle to turn off engine; driver's compliance deemed voluntary.) 
The evidence in the case before this Court resembles Fry and requires a finding that 
Officer Neal seized the defendant. The officer's question, much like the one in Fry, did not give 
the defendant the choice to simply not answer and go on swimming. While the Magistrate made 
no specific finding on the point, the fact is that people cannot breathe water and can and often do 
die when they attempt it. Further, a lake is a body of water of considerable size, particularly Lake 
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Coeur d'Alene, the lake in this case. Thus, it is somewhat incredible to believe that the 
defendant had the ability to "walk away" from the encounter or felt "free to leave." Without 
some finding that the defendant had the ability to swim for long distances at speeds greater than 
an officer can run, this Court must confine itself to the rational inference that would have arisen 
from the defendant's predicament; namely, that he had nowhere to go. That alone is sufficient to 
find a seizure under a Terry analysis. In State v. Greason, 809 P.2d 695, 697 (Or.App.1991) the 
defendant was being questioned by an officer on a boat. The Court found: 
Although defendant may have felt that he was not free to leave, that alone is not 
dispositive. For example, during a "stop," which is "a temporary restraint of a 
person's liberty by a peace officer lawfully present in any place," ORS 131.605(5), 
a reasonable person would believe that he is "not free to leave." State v. Horton, 
86 Or.App. 199,202, 738 P.2d 609 (1987). Nonetheless, a valid stop may be 
followed by an officer's reasonable inquiry, ORS 131.615(1), and generally that 
inquiry need not be preceded by warnings. Here, the officer did what was 
necessary under the circumstances to gather information to confirm or dispel his 
suspicion that defendant had operated the boat while intoxicated. 
Id. The issue in that case was whether the defendant was in custody for purposes of 
Miranda, but as the dissent of Judge Buttler reveals, the reason for finding the defendant 
was detained is remarkably similar to the case at bar: 
The court found that he was not free to leave at that time. That finding is 
supported by the evidence: Defendant could not have left without swimming. 
Id. at 699. 
It is not unusual for the state to argue that the reasonable man indulges the police at every 
opportunity. However, it is unusual for courts to accept the absurdity the state is forced to 
present. In US v. Robertson, 736 F.3d 677, 680-81 (4th Cir.2013), the Court ruled that: 
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This case turns on the difference between voluntary consent to a request versus 
begrudging submission to a command. Here, Mr. Robertson's behavior was the 
latter. The area around the bus shelter was dominated by police officers. See US. 
v. Lattimore, 87 F.3d 647,650 (4th Cir.1996) (citing number of officers present as 
a factor weighing against consent). There were three patrol cars and five 
uniformed officers with holstered weapons. Before the encounter, Mr. Robertson 
observed every other individual in the bus shelter get "handled by" the other 
police officers. (J.A 46.) As these individuals were being dealt with, yet another 
officer approached the bus shelter and focused on Mr. Robertson. 
The officer's questioning was immediately accusatory: Officer Welch's first 
question was whether Mr. Robertson had anything illegal on him. See US. v. Elie, 
111 F.3d 1135, 1145 (4th Cir.1997) (arguing that friendly conversation rather than 
accusatory questions militates towards consent). When Mr. Robertson responded 
with silence, the officer waved Mr. Robertson forward and asked to conduct a 
search. Mr. Robertson's exit was blocked by Officer Welch, who never informed 
Mr. Robertson that he had the right to refuse the search. See Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 
650 ( citing individual's knowledge of a right to refuse a search as relevant to a 
consent finding). Officer Welch's initial, accusatory question, combined with the 
police-dominated atmosphere, clearly communicated to Mr. Robertson that he was 
not free to leave or to refuse Officer Welch's request to conduct a search. Mr. 
Robertson's only options were to submit to the search peacefully or resist 
violently. Mr. Robertson chose the sensible route. See US. v. Albrektsen, 151 F.3d 
951 (9th Cir.1998) ( "[Defendant] was forced to move so that the entering officers 
would not knock him down. Consent that is not.") (internal quotations omitted). 
Further, the police interaction in this case lacks factors that indicate consent. In 
United States v. Elie, involving a search of the defendant's hotel room, we found it 
highly relevant that the defendant repeatedly asked the police to search and secure 
the items in his hotel room. 111 F.3d 1135, 1145 ( 4th Cir.1997). Similarly, in 
Lattimore,. the defendant gave verbal consent and also signed a written consent 
form after the police officer carefully explained that he wanted to search the 
defendant's car. 87 F.3d at 649-50. In this case, meanwhile, Mr. Robertson never 
gave verbal or written consent; he merely smTendered to a police officer's 
command. Further, in both Elie and Lattimore,. the interactions between the police 
and the defendants occurred in broad daylight and were characterized by relaxed, 
friendly conversation between the two sides. See Elie, 111 F.3d at 1145 ("nothing 
in the record indicates an environment that was coercive or intimidating. In fact, 
Elie engaged the officers in friendly conversation"); Lattimore, 87 F.3d at 651 ("at 
no time did the officer use force or a threat of force to coerce Lattimore's consent. 
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In fact, the two men engaged in friendly conversation"). The situation here, 
meanwhile, lacks those indicia of consent. Officer Welch's initial question was 
accusatory and was met with cold silence. Officer Welch never received verbal or 
written consent. Mr. Robertson's behavior was not a clear-eyed, voluntary 
invitation to be searched; it was a begrudging surrender to Officer Welch's order. 
In sum, the facts as presented by Officer Welch are not enough for the government 
to demonstrate valid consent. Surrounded by police officers, Mr. Robertson 
watched as every individual in a bus shelter next to him was handled by the 
police. Soon thereafter, Mr. Robertson was confronted by a police officer who 
immediately sought to verify whether Mr. Robertson was carrying anything illegal 
before waving him forward. Given these facts, we are compelled to conclude that 
the government has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating consent. 
Accordingly, we reverse the district court's refusal to suppress evidence. 
The Court in Robertson was dealing with a consent to search rather than a consensual 
contact, but the rationale remains the same. Simply because the defendant recognized that he had 
nowhere to go and acquiesced to the officer, hardly means he consented to an encounter, as the 
Idaho Court of Appeals recognized in Fry, 122 Idaho at 103: 
In Fry the police officers "unlike other cases in which the police request the subject's 
cooperation in answering questions, the inquiry here as to what Fry was doing did not 
give Fry the option of answering or not ... " 
citing Fry, 122 Idaho at 103. Submission is not consent, as the citizens of this nation know all 
too well. 
CONCLUSION 
The case before this Court is not a complicated one. The officer gave the defendant no 
quarter and had no reason to force an encounter. When he did it anyway, he violated long 
standing limits on executive power. Therefore, Article I§ 17 of the Idaho Constitution requires 
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that the evidence that resulted from the initial, unjustified seizure be excluded. State v. Guzman, 
122 Idaho 981, 995 (1992) (not the exclusionary rule, but the constitutional provision itself 
impedes fact-finding function of Court- but this is a "price the framers anticipated and were 
willing to pay"). This Court should so find, reverse the denial of the defendanf s Motion to 
Suppress, and remand this case with an order requiring that the Magistrate allow the defendant to 
withdraw his plea. 
DATED this f ;1 day of November, 2014. 
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THE LAW OFFICE OF THE KOOTENAI 
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